"Ruiz Law Centre" in Foreclosure?

And Rudy Aragon is on the hunt:

A Miami office building controlled by John H. Ruiz, an attorney with his own TV program, is facing foreclosure over a $10.7 million mortgage.

First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.    (NASDAQ: FCNCA) filed the foreclosure lawsuit on June 8 against 5040 Corp., which lists Ruiz as its president. His law offices and his La Ley TV operations are based in the 104,307-square-foot building at 5040 N.W. 7^th Street. The nine-story building was completed in 1986. The foreclosure action also targets a neighboring 18,731-square-foot parking lot.

The building is named the Ruiz Law Centre.

First off, I had totally forgotten that Rudy was now at White & Case.

Secondly, I'm sure this is a misunderstanding.

It's just $10.7 million, give the guy a break!

SFL Friday: The Check is in the Mail!

Literally:

When asked about the outstanding bills, Ruiz said: “It’s not past due. We mailed it out already. It’s always paid on time.” 

Shorter Julie Kay -- Rhett Traband once had a prom date(!):

"We were on the short list, and we kind of got disinvited," said Rhett Traband, who represents Caro Group, which claims a $10 million investment loss. "I feel like I had a prom date and lost it."

Sheesh Rhett, I sure know what that's like (see above).

(What can I say -- I still love Amy Irving -- I just wished she would have married the Pickle Man!).

"I Have No Financial Problems, and My Firm Is Very Profitable."

That is so weird -- I don't know about you, but I wake up every morning and repeat the aforesaid affirmation exactly 36 times (double chai, bubbe!).

And it turns out I'm not alone:

Ruiz, a Miami attorney, wears many hats.

He hosts a Spanish-language Internet show "La Ley Con John H. Ruiz," runs a Latin cafe in one of his law offices and operates an eight-lawyer Miami law firm specializing in foreclosure defense, class action and personal injury.

Ruiz's sports broadcast venture largely has been fueled by fees from an estimated 8,000 foreclosure cases, as well as from multimillion-dollar settlements in some high-profile cases involving families of Chalks Airlines crash victims, thousands of GEICO drivers and plaintiffs in fen phen, Baycol and other pharmaceutical cases.

But a host of lawsuits, Florida Bar complaints, foreclosures and liens raise questions about whether the rapid growth of his diversified enterprises is outstripping his ability to sustain them. Ruiz insists those legal disputes bear no reflection on the financial strength of his businesses.

"I have no financial problems, and my firm is very profitable," he said.

Me too!

(Except we're always struggling to make payroll and I have all those lawsuits against me).

"I have no financial problems, and my firm is very profitable."
"I have no financial problems, and my firm is very profitable."
"I have no financial problems, and my firm is very profitable."

Repeat 33 more times.....

I feel much better now.

BTW, we should all have such problems.

Somebody Wants John Ruiz's Yacht!

What kind of scoundrel would seek to deprive a hard-working lawyer of his yacht?

Oh yeah, the bank.

3d DCA Watch -- And Hijinks Ensued!

The sun is shining, the coffee is swilling, the robes are a-wearing, and the opinions are as fresh as a nice sliced tongue on rye, so let's dig right in to this week's 3d DCA Watch:

Ruscalleda v. HSBC Bank:

How cute -- two banks foreclosing on the very same mortgage!

This is like that episode from Three's Company where Jack has to entertain two dates at the very same time, all at the Regal Beagle:

After filing their pro se answer and affirmative defenses, the defendants retained counsel. Continuing in their mistaken belief, they did not inform their attorney of the action filed by HSBC. On November 13, 2008, counsel filed an amended answer and affirmative defenses on behalf of the defendants in the American Home Mortgage action, but took no action on the HSBC complaint.

Although the defendants did not file an answer in response to HSBC’s complaint, HSBC never moved for a default judgment.3 Instead, on January 22, 2009, HSBC moved for summary judgment, scheduling the hearing for March 24, 2009. When the defendants received the motion for summary judgment in the HSBC action, it sent the motion to their counsel. It was at that point, that the defendants and their counsel realized that two separate banks were attempting to simultaneously foreclose on the same mortgage, but that they only had been defending the initial action filed by American Home Mortgage.

Ok, it's like that episode except John Ruiz had no idea he was on another date.

Sunshine Guardrail v. FL Unemployment Commission:

Shorter Judge Schwartz -- "Several zeros are still zero."

How funny -- I got that exact fortune at New Chinatown the other night.

Commercial Jet v. U.S. Bank:

Speaking of Judge Schwartz, here's a carefully measured dissent from him on statutory construction:

The majority holding that following that provision did not have the effect specifically provided by the legislature is in conflict with just about every canon of legislative interpretation there is, including: that statutory words must be accorded their plain meaning; that every statute must be deemed to have some meaning and accomplish something (here, the court’s ruling renders the filing of the lien of no effect whatever); that a statute dealing with a specific subject, such as aircraft, must be deemed to control over a general one such as section 713.58, which applies to all personal property, and no doubt other general rules which no one has thought it necessary to devise—until now.

Wow -- that's a 114-word sentence!

I don't know about you, but he had me at word 52.

3d DCA Watch -- Evening of Revelry Edition!

Well folks, it's hump day and you know what that means.....

Hermitage v. Oxygen In the Grove:

So you're partying in the Grove, it's closing time, and of course you left your wallet back in the club.

Who hasn't done that before?

But here the poor schmuck knocked on the door one too many times and got the crap beat out of him (allegedly) -- Judge Shepherd understands:

The complaint alleges after an evening of revelry, Rivera left the premises and then returned for his wallet, which he thought he left inside. Because the club had closed for the night, Rivera knocked on the door and was greeted by a bouncer, who said he would look for the wallet. After what seemed to Rivera to be an inordinate time, Rivera again knocked on the door. At that point, Rivera alleges the bouncer reappeared and, without provocation, assaulted and battered him.

Oh well, so you settled against the club but it turns out there might be insurance covering negligent acts?

Too bad too sad:

However, the rule is not intended to spare counsel from his own tactical errors or mistakes. See Fla. High Sch. Activities, Inc. v. Latimer, 750 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“This rule is not intended to relieve a party from its own tactical mistakes.” (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Isom, 681 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“[R]ule 1.540 does not provide relief for judgmental mistakes nor tactical errors of counsel nor from mistakes of law. This rule merely provides relief from judgments based on mistakes which result from oversight, neglect or accident.”)). That is the nature of the error pled in this case.

On to more revelry.....

Archbishop Colman F. Carroll High School v. Maynoldi:

This case involves a tragic single car alcohol-fueled accident arising from an end-of-year high school party. The question is whether the school has any liability.

Judge Salter grapples with some unusual facts (including a "skit" about the party on the morning announcements and a visit to the party by the school principal) but ultimately says no:

No conscientious juror or judge could (or can now) feel anything but the deepest sympathy for the tragic results of Gabriel’s accident. But our legal system requires more than heartfelt sympathy and demonstrable damages as predicates for the compensation of injured persons. Although this case involves three novel aspects that were not considered in Concepcion—the school’s interception of the “praty” invitations and “skit” in response, the parent and student handbook provisions, and the visit by the principal and employee to the residence where the party was underway—we conclude that these circumstances were insufficient as a matter of law to impose upon the school a duty to supervise, or a duty under the undertaker’s doctrine, regarding Gabriel’s acquisition and consumption of alcohol, attendance at the party, and fatal decision to get behind the wheel.

Ramle Int. v. The Greens Condo:

So you get an entitlement to fees and you wait 11 months to file your fee motion?

What's the big deal? There's all that juicy statutory interest, right?

Judge Salter says it's no big deal, and Rule 1.525 doesn't apply:

In the instant case, as in Amerus, the prevailing party’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees had already been determined, and the trial court merely reserved jurisdiction to determine the amounts. Although the eleven-month delay in this case exceeds the eight-month delay in Amerus, we do not believe that distinction makes a difference in the analysis or outcome.

Ok, I agree that once you have a determination, being surprised and/or prejudiced isn't as much of a factor.

But 11 months? At some point shouldn't these factors reemerge as legitimate issues -- is there no reasonable end point?

Perez v. Deutsche Bank:

John Ruiz won reversal of a foreclosure, with David Stern on the other side.

Was it John's silver-tongued oral argument? His brilliant research and case citation?

Deutsche Bank was precluded from participating at oral argument in this case for failure to timely file an answer brief.

Alrighty then!

And finally we have Judge Schwartz in Lower Keys Medical v. Windisch:

How contrary is the petitioner's position to some controlling case?

Directly:

The petitioner’s position in this case is directly contrary to Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008), and each of the other District Courts of Appeal.

Ooh, that doesn't sound too good.

Anything else?

Even if we were inclined, which we are not, we do not have the authority to rule otherwise. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The petitioner’s suggestion that we might do so is insulting and frivolous.

I said GOOD DAY, SIR!

Not Now John.

Let's see, it's hump day and I'm getting cranky again.

When oh when will the Resplendent Ones emit their utterances?

I see former heavyweight champion and noted TV star John Ruiz has filed a Toyota gas pedal lawsuit:

Ruiz, who hosts a live late night Spanish program on legal issues called La Ley, said he's already representing hundreds of Toyota owners including owners without sticking pedals worried about the value of their cars.

"Some entities report that it's between 4 and 6 percent. The reality is it's more like 20%. The reality is that no one wants to buy one of these cars right now. You can't resale the car in the marketplace after these issues," said Ruiz.

Ruiz is also looking into something you hear about in the news all the time; when a person parking their car suddenly accelerates into a store front.

"There is no doubt that in some of these cases we are going to be able to determine that it was a faulty part as opposed to what they call driver error." said Ruiz.

Sorry John, your clients will have to be fatally injured in an accelerator crash before they have a cognizable claim for damages.

Also, the Disney Relief Act is moving through the state legislature, much to Mike Haggard's dismay:

"This bill has taken us back Draconian steps from last year,'' said Michael Haggard, the president of the trial lawyers lobbying arm, the Florida Justice Association.

Without the threat of litigation, Haggard reasoned, businesses would have no incentive to prioritize safety.

"It gives immunity to businesses to hurt kids,'' Haggard said. ``It's a higher standard that only applies to children.''

Mike, wrong again.

I look at it this way: so a few kids have to die every year on an unsafe ride -- and that's certainly sad I admit -- but their sacrifice enables the rest of us to enjoy a nice family day at the amusement park.

I mean, we're talking Disney!

3d DCA Watch -- Not a Good Day to Be John Ruiz

I like John, and have had some good dealings with him, as I am sure many of you have had as well.

That's why today's opinion from the 3d DCA is causing us here at SFL some cognitive dissonance. The case involves a slip and fall at an apartment building that John and a partner allegedly owned through a company called Carmel:

While a single badge of fraud may amount only to a suspicious circumstance, a combination of badges will justify a finding of fraud. United States v. Fernon, 640 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Dowell, 592 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). “The existence of badges of fraud create a prima facie case and raise a rebuttable presumption that the transaction is void.” Stephens v. Kies Oil Co., Inc., 386 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Consideration may also be given to factors other than those listed. In re Miller, 188 B.R. 302, 305-306 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). Courts may take into account the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. Kirk v. Edinger, 380 So. 2d 1336, 1337 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

In our case, these circumstances included: (1) requesting an extension of time to file an answer until the closing on the apartment complex; (2) filing an answer and eleven affirmative defenses without mentioning that the complex has been sold and the closing is taking place that same day; (3) receiving a request to produce from the plaintiff and waiting until the thirtieth day to then move to withdraw; (4) filing a motion to withdraw for irreconcilable differences without explaining that those differences were with a corporation in which counsel was a 50 percent owner and director; and (5) certifying in the motion to withdraw that it was not made in an effort to delay the action and was “made in good faith.” Here, Mejia clearly satisfied her burden by presenting numerous undisputed facts which supported several badges of fraud, as well as additional facts and circumstances buttressing a finding that Carmel did “delay, hinder or defraud” Mejia.

Query why Judge Scola -- a very smart and capable judge -- went the other way on fraudulent transfer. Does anyone have more background on this case?