1101 Channelside Dr Tampa FL 33602 |
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1101 Channelside Dr Tampa FL 33602 |
In an unusual case, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled today in Kerzner v. Kerzner & Kerzner, and affirmed the lower tribunal’s ruling that a former spouse who had intervened in the divorce of her former spouse and his current wife could not recover on judgments for unpaid child support from the proceeds of a voluntarily sold home, on the basis that the Former Husband was entitled to homestead protection.
The Second District Court of Appeal ruled today in P.G. v. E.W., in so doing reversing the lower tribunal’s denial of the Former Husband’s Petition to Disestablish Paternity. In reversing, the Second District found first that a primary residential parent or a parent ordered to share in uncovered medical expenses qualifies as a “male ordered to pay child support” within the meaning of Florida Statute 742.18. Next, the Court found that even a parent who perhaps should have suspected paternity was in question could raise DNA testing results as newly discovered evidence in support of a petition to disestablish. And, in addition, the Court found that such a parent was not disqualified for any behavior suggested to violate F.S. 742.18(3) prior to receipt of the DNA results. The Second District acknowledged the clear conflict as to this ruling between this case and Hooks v. Quaintance, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2214 (Fla. 1st DCA October 6, 2011). Finally, the Court rejected the idea that the primary residential parent continuing to exert parental authority was barred from seeking to disestablish that paternity. The Second District expressly finds in closing that the 2006 statutory provisions permit a parent to seek this relief where it would have been barred in the past.
The Ordinance mandates that the Traffic Control Infraction Review Officer review and verify the recorded images prior to the issuance of a notice of violation which parallels the requirement that a traffic infraction enforcement officer under the Uniform Traffic Control Law observe the traffic violation and, does not conflict with the requirements of subsection 316.640(5)(a), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in its determination that section 48-26 allowed the cameras to serve as the sole basis for issuing a notice of violation in direct conflict with section 316.007, Florida Statutes.Ah yes, doesn't every hamlet have an
The City and the majority’s reliance on section 316.008(1)(w) as the statute’s express grant of authority is, however, misplaced. The City’s unmanned cameras placed at various intersections do not regulate nor restrict traffic, and Masone does not allege that the use of cameras to monitor traffic is preempted by or in conflict with Florida law. What Masone correctly argues is that section 316.008(1)(w) does not expressly grant municipalities the authority to: (1) enforce by ordinance, violations of traffic infractions, including red light violations, already being enforced under Florida’s uniform traffic laws; (2) punish alleged violators on an adjudication on the merits in a “court” unauthorized by the Florida Constitution or state statute; (3) create a different standard of proof and liability for red light violations than that which has been approved by the Legislature; and (4) establish penalties not authorized by chapters 316 or 318.She also helpfully identifies all the conflicts with state law -- the first two seem most pertinent:
(1) Whereas section 316.075 punishes drivers who commit traffic light infractions, the City’s ordinance punishes the owner of the vehicle which is observed committing a red light traffic infraction unless the owner submits an affidavit stating that at the time the infraction was being committed, his/her vehicle was being driven without his/her consent.Hmm -- "driver" vs. "owner of the vehicle"; and "personally observe" vs. "review recorded images" -- what am I missing here?
The affidavit must include the identity of the person who had care, custody or control of the vehicle, if known, or include a police report if the vehicle was stolen.
(2) Whereas section 316.640(5)(a) requires the traffic enforcement officer to personally observe the commission of the traffic infraction, the City’s ordinance only requires that a traffic enforcement officer review the recorded images taken by a camera installed by the City at the subject intersection.
Administrative Order 2011-100 In re: Amendments to the Local Rules.I just tear up every time I read this!
Amendments to the Southern District of Florida Local Rules will go into effect on December 1, 2011. To obtain a copy of Administrative Order 2011-100 which includes the amendments to the Local Rules, please visit our website, www.flsd.uscourts.gov, under Public Notices. You can obtain a copy of the new Local Rules with amendments on our website under the Attorney Resources tab, Local Rules & Procedures, as well as under the Public Notices section on the left hand column of the website.
DUI Drug Test Refusal |
Upon consideration of the appellees’ confession of error, which we find to be eminently well taken, the default money judgment under review is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.I think I know who wrote that!
When a party itself is paying substantial funds into a receivership, as here, it seems reasonable that some of those funds might be authorized for payment of that party’s attorneys. But the linchpin of a receivership is the principle that a receiver, like the appointing court itself, is a neutral party in the underlying dispute. The receiver’s role is the preservation and protection of the assets in dispute, not as a paying agent for the litigation-related legal expenses of one of the parties.With the exception of that firm which now has to disgorge all those fees -- have a great Thanksgiving weekend!
To be sure, this was a most unusual and unique case. The saga endured by plaintiffs might well make a script for a book. (Ed. -- or a whole mess of blog posts!) The ensuing claims addressed by defendant were as far from "run of the mill'' as anyone could imagine. The Court is not without sympathy for the ordeal plaintiffs went through. Indeed, the record is full of indicators of sympathy on several fronts -including that of at least one of the adjusters handling this case. This clearly contributed to the most unusual happenstance of - on more than one occasion - the defendant paying claims without supporting documentation, simply on the "say-so'' of Mr. Halmos, and in the end resulted in more than one substantial overpayment. The uncontroverted evidence is that an almost symbiotic relationship developed between Mr. Halmos and the primary INA adjuster, Pamela Harting- Forkey . . . until supporting materials for claim s were requested and claims began to be questioned. lt then turned quite adversarial - at least on the part of plaintiffs. Notwithstanding said sympathy, however, the Court reaches its decisions herein without being "influenced in any way by sympathy, or by prejudice, for or against anyone.'' Eleventh Circuit Standard Instruction regarding Consideration of The Evidence.Let's just say the case came down to credibility determinations, and here's a small example of where the Judge's head was at on that issue:
Third, IYC intentionally misrepresented that the Merideth Law Firm invoices were "legal and Legal Support Services'' related to salvage and protection against loss of the Legacy due to Hurricane Wilma, even though the time was for Halmos, a non-lawyer partner in the District of Columbia-based Merideth Law Firm, and his employees. See FF 148-50. 'I'he Court finds Mr. Halmos' "partnership'' in Washington D.C. of no significance, as the alleged work done and billed) was done in Florida, not in D.C., and by Mr. Halmos' own version of the facts, was done under supervision of a Florida lawyer. There is no evidence in this record of that lawyers' affiliation with the Merideth Law Firm. In making such representations, Halmos not only violated the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, see D.C. R. Prof Conduct 5.541) (prohibiting individuals from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in other jurisdictions, such as Florida); D.C. R.Prof Conduct 5.409(2) & (3) (the nonlawyer in partnership with the District of Columbia law organization must abide by (the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct), he violated Florida law, see Fla. Stat. j 454.23 ("Any person not licensed or otherwise authorized to practice 1aw in this state who practices 1aw in this state or holds himself or herself out to the public as qualified to practice law in this state, or who willfully pretends to be, or willfully takes or uses any name, title, addition, or description implying that he or she is qualifed, or recognized by law as qualified, to practice law in this state, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in sec 775.082, sec 775.083, or sec 775.084.5').Huh?
To borrow lyrics, albeit out of context, from a Keith Urban song, “And maybe it’s a little too early / To know if this is gonna work.”3Ok Judge, I'm with you.
3 Urban, Keith. “You Look Good In My Shirt.” Lyrics. Golden Road. Capitol, 2002, available at http://www.lyrics007.com/Keith%20Urban%20Lyrics/You%20Look%20Good%20In%20My%20Shirt%20Lyrics.html. Born in New Zealand, Urban is a country singer/songwriter who was voted Top New Male Vocalist at the 2001 Country Music Association Awards. He was named CMA’s Entertainer of the Year in 2005. In 2006, Urban won his first Grammy Award and married Australian-born actress Nicole Kidman later that year. Keith Urban Biography - Facts, Birthday, Life Story, http://www.biography.com/people/keith-urban-193217 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). Based on preliminary research, it does not appear that Mr. Urban has released any songs expressly discussing the concept of Article III standing.Oy -- you were doing great until you big-footed it right at the end!
“And I heard last night that one of the women is pregnant, so maybe we’re going to have our first baby,” says Kelley Roark, a Miami attorney who supports Occupy Miami and has advised the movement in its sometimes-prickly negotiations with the county over its permit to use the plaza.Good for you, Kelley! (You can learn more about Ms. Roark's practice here).
The Fifth District Court reversed today in Tuomey v. Tuomey, in so doing finding merit in two arguments raised by the former husband in his appeal of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. First, the Court neglected to include the parties’ stipulation as to contact between a relative and the minor children, and the Fifth DCA found this to be error, citing Johnson v. Johnson, 663 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Next, the trial court was found to be in error for offsetting the Former Husband’s payment of expenses related to the former marital home pending its sale against its fair rental value without making any finding as to the amount of that rental value. However, the Former Husband’s claim of error to the effect that the lower court distributed unvested stock options as a marital asset was rejected, as the record reflected on careful review that only vested options were distributed.
After more than two years of partner defections, layoffs, office closings, and mounting financial difficulties, Ruden McClosky filed for Chapter 11 protection Tuesday in its hometown of Fort Lauderdale. The firm, which has eight offices in Florida, plans to sell a substantial portion of its assets to Greenspoon Marder, another Fort Lauderdale–based firm, according to sibling publication the Daily Business Review.
Founded in 1959, Ruden McClosky had vociferously denied that it would consider dissolving, even as a flood of lateral departures caused the firm to suffer financially. Ruden McClosky responded to the loss of lawyers by shaking up its leadership and pursuing potential mergers with Cleveland-based Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff over the summer and Greenspoon Marder last month.But the deal was contingent on former partners accepting only 30 percent of their equity payments, an arrangement that has apparently collapsed:
Ruden McClosky, which once boasted more than 200 lawyers, was hit hard by the collapse of the Florida real estate market and saw its head count dwindle to its current total of 66 lawyers. In its bankruptcy filing, the firm lists both debts and assets of between $10 million and $50 million.
The deal with Greenspoon Marder was contingent on 58 former Ruden McClosky equity partners accepting payouts of 30 percent on $3.5 million in outstanding equity payments, according to DBR. Ruden McClosky had stopped making payments to former partners in January, and many of those same partners faced a Monday deadline to reach a deal on the remaining $3.5 million obligation so that the agreement with Greenspoon Marder could proceed. The sale to Greenspoon Marder was structured as a sale, rather than a merger, so that the successor firm wouldn't acquire any of Ruden McClosky's liabilities, according to a lawyer familiar with the Chapter 11 case.
But the South Florida Business Journal reported Wednesday that the plan to pay dozens of former Ruden McClosky partners had collapsed prior to the firm filing its Chapter 11 petition, and that they would have to file claims with the bankruptcy court in order to recoup what they are owed. Lawrence Gordich, a former Ruden McClosky partner who left the firm last year to open his own shop in Miami, is representing a group of ex-partners in the case. Gordich did not respond to a request for comment.You car crash gawkers can see the bankruptcy docket here and the Chapter 11 filing here.
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed yesterday in Mata v. Mata, a case in which the lower tribunal had granted the appellee’s emergency motion to permit relocation of the parties’ minor child to North Carolina. The lower court did not take evidence or testimony, but found based on argument and the pleadings that a temporary relocation would be permitted. The District Court reversed on the basis that the lower court did not consider the factors in F.S. 61.13002(6)(b)(2) before granting the Mother’s motion for a temporary relocation. The Court made no finding of a likelihood that the eventual relocation would be granted, and its failure to take testimony or evidence supporting the ruling was found unreasonable as well.
The First District Court of Appeal reversed yesterday in D.O.R., ex rel Sherman v. Daly, finding that the lower court improperly deviated from the guideline support amount by using the “gross up” method for calculating support in a case where not the parenting plan, but rather the parties’ informal agreement, provided for substantially shared time-sharing between the parents.
The Fourth District Court reversed the lower tribunal’s judgment granting a modification of child support in Capo v. Capo yesterday, finding that the lower court’s failure to make findings as to the net income of each party as a starting point for calculating child support was sufficient to require remand.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued an opinion yesterday in Escobar v. Escobar, in so doing reversing the lower court’s determination that a retroactive modification of child support back to the date of a 2004 Final Judgment was required. The ruling below was based on conflicting statements in the Final Judgment as to whether the support was to be paid bi-weekly or semi-monthly. The Fourth District found error in the lower tribunal’s essential overruling of a final, prior ruling that found no ambiguity in the Final Judgment’s determination of support, which was not appealed. Error was also found in the Court’s review of issues not properly plead.
On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff produced documents to Defendants by computer disc, in response to Defendants’ First Request for Production of Documents (DE # 68 at 2). The disc contained several documents, including emails and documents exchanged between Michael Rowles, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Plaintiff Live Nation Worldwide, Inc. (“Live Nation”), and Joyce Smyth, who is the personal representative of Mick Jagger, the lead singer of the music band The Rolling Stones (DE # 68 at 2).Hold on -- "music band" the Rolling Stones?
Seal Expunge Florida Record |
While on the hit TV show the “Jersey Shore” and as in his everyday life, Sorrentino (along with other cast members) occasionally wore Abercrombie brand clothing.Starting August 2011, Defendant embarked on a grand, worldwide advertising campaign using Sorrentino’s name, image and likeness to create brand awareness for its products by falsely claiming that Defendant had offered money to Sorrentino if he would stop wearing Defendant’s goods.Defendant concocted this false advertising campaign using the name and image of Sorrentino, to promote and advertise Defendant’s stores and its products. This advertising campaign claimed that Sorrentino was contrary to the “aspirational nature of the (Abercrombie) brand”.As part of the campaign, on August 12, 2011 stories were written by the press stating that the advertising campaign was a “marketing ploy” designed “to further (Abercrombie’s) name into the marketplace with one of the hottest brands on tv” which was intentionally and strategically released at the peak of the back to school season. A true and correct copy of the press release is attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and hereafter called the “Press Release”As part of the marketing ploy, Defendant contacted representatives of MTV (the network that distributes the “Jersey Shore”) and allegedly offered to pay money to the Sorrentino if he would stop wearing Abercrombie brand clothing while on the show and at other times.That offer was never made to Sorrentino, nor was it ever conveyed to Sorrentino by a representative of Defendant.Defendant claimed in the press release that by wearing Abercrombie clothing, Sorrentino would be “causing significant damage” to the image of the Abercrombie brand. In essence, Defendant’s campaign was to make the ridiculous claim that Sorrentino was not worthy enough to wear Abercrombie clothing or that Sorrentino was so undesirable that wearing Abercrombie clothing would cause “damage” to Defendant. The center piece of the advertising campaign was the huge success and popularity of Sorrentino. The falsity of the advertising campaign is further demonstrated by Defendants actions to (at the same time that they are claiming that Sorrentino was damaging their image) attempt to associate themselves with Sorrentino by openly advertising specifically designed t-shirts using the Plaintiffs’ Marks.