Thứ Tư, 30 tháng 11, 2011

Criminal Defense Attorney | New 1101 Channelside Drive Office | Tampa FL 33602

Tampa criminal defense attorney
1101 Channelside Dr
Tampa FL 33602
Tampa Criminal Defense Attorney has a New Office on the Fourth Floor at 1101 Channelside Dr Tampa FL 33602. W F Casey Ebsary, Jr. is a Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer. Serious charges deserve a serious defense. Discuss how he can help you or your family. 

Call Casey at 813-222-2220.



Office: Tampa, Florida 1101 Channelside Drive, Tampa, FL 33602. Licensed in Florida, Federal Middle District of Florida, and the 11th Federal Circuit. Call Casey Toll Free 813-222-2220.

Tampa criminal defense attorney

Third DCA Bars Spousal Recovery Based on Homestead Protection

In an unusual case, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled today in Kerzner v. Kerzner & Kerzner, and affirmed the lower tribunal’s ruling that a former spouse who had intervened in the divorce of her former spouse and his current wife could not recover on judgments for unpaid child support from the proceeds of a voluntarily sold home, on the basis that the Former Husband was entitled to homestead protection.

Second District Reverses Denial of Petition for Disestablishment of Paternity

The Second District Court of Appeal ruled today in P.G. v. E.W., in so doing reversing the lower tribunal’s denial of the Former Husband’s Petition to Disestablish Paternity.  In reversing, the Second District found first that a primary residential parent or a parent ordered to share in uncovered medical expenses qualifies as a “male ordered to pay child support” within the meaning of Florida Statute 742.18.  Next, the Court found that even a parent who perhaps should have suspected paternity was in question could raise DNA testing results as newly discovered evidence in support of a petition to disestablish.  And, in addition, the Court found that such a parent was not disqualified for any behavior suggested to violate F.S. 742.18(3) prior to receipt of the DNA results.  The Second District acknowledged the clear conflict as to this ruling between this case and Hooks v. Quaintance, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2214 (Fla. 1st DCA October 6, 2011).  Finally, the Court rejected the idea that the primary residential parent continuing to exert parental authority was barred from seeking to disestablish that paternity.  The Second District expressly finds in closing that the 2006 statutory provisions permit a parent to seek this relief where it would have been barred in the past.

3d DCA Watch -- Eye in the Sky Edition.



Yes Virginia, Aventura can legally film you running red lights:
The Ordinance mandates that the Traffic Control Infraction Review Officer review and verify the recorded images prior to the issuance of a notice of violation which parallels the requirement that a traffic infraction enforcement officer under the Uniform Traffic Control Law observe the traffic violation and, does not conflict with the requirements of subsection 316.640(5)(a), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in its determination that section 48-26 allowed the cameras to serve as the sole basis for issuing a notice of violation in direct conflict with section 316.007, Florida Statutes.
Ah yes, doesn't every hamlet have an Orwellian neighborly "Traffic Control Infraction Review Officer" -- just like Barney Fife!

But the dissent, well, dissents.

Sayeth The Rothenberg:
The City and the majority’s reliance on section 316.008(1)(w) as the statute’s express grant of authority is, however, misplaced. The City’s unmanned cameras placed at various intersections do not regulate nor restrict traffic, and Masone does not allege that the use of cameras to monitor traffic is preempted by or in conflict with Florida law. What Masone correctly argues is that section 316.008(1)(w) does not expressly grant municipalities the authority to: (1) enforce by ordinance, violations of traffic infractions, including red light violations, already being enforced under Florida’s uniform traffic laws; (2) punish alleged violators on an adjudication on the merits in a “court” unauthorized by the Florida Constitution or state statute; (3) create a different standard of proof and liability for red light violations than that which has been approved by the Legislature; and (4) establish penalties not authorized by chapters 316 or 318.
 She also helpfully identifies all the conflicts with state law -- the first two seem most pertinent:
(1) Whereas section 316.075 punishes drivers who commit traffic light infractions, the City’s ordinance punishes the owner of the vehicle which is observed committing a red light traffic infraction unless the owner submits an affidavit stating that at the time the infraction was being committed, his/her vehicle was being driven without his/her consent.
The affidavit must include the identity of the person who had care, custody or control of the vehicle, if known, or include a police report if the vehicle was stolen.

(2) Whereas section 316.640(5)(a) requires the traffic enforcement officer to personally observe the commission of the traffic infraction, the City’s ordinance only requires that a traffic enforcement officer review the recorded images taken by a camera installed by the City at the subject intersection.
Hmm -- "driver" vs. "owner of the vehicle"; and "personally observe" vs. "review recorded images" -- what am I missing here?

(Or are we in "meaningfully distinguishable" territory again?)

Judges Emas and Lagoa go at it over an arbitration provision.

Important PIP opinion here.

Wow, three dissenting opinions this week -- cut back on the egg nog, fellas!



Thứ Ba, 29 tháng 11, 2011

You Now Have New Rules.



I just received this passionate and heartfelt personal message from the old man in the cave:
Administrative Order 2011-100 In re: Amendments to the Local Rules.

Amendments to the Southern District of Florida Local Rules will go into effect on December 1, 2011. To obtain a copy of Administrative Order 2011-100 which includes the amendments to the Local Rules, please visit our website, www.flsd.uscourts.gov, under Public Notices. You can obtain a copy of the new Local Rules with amendments on our website under the Attorney Resources tab, Local Rules & Procedures, as well as under the Public Notices section on the left hand column of the website.
I just tear up every time I read this!

(You can also find the new local rules here.)

Nice work Kevin and the entire "ad hoc" team!

In other news, RIP ole' Georgy -- you were a good egg.



Judge Scola's First Order as a Federal Judge?



It has to do with a massive Ponzi scheme where investors were defrauded out of more than $50 million.

How cute!

Thứ Hai, 28 tháng 11, 2011

Note to Brandon -- Never Have Nothing to Say!



Brandon, you can see Spencer asking the very same question from everyone around the table, and you're the last one asked (around 2:25 in) -- dude, come on!

Chủ Nhật, 27 tháng 11, 2011

DUI Drug Test Refusal Overturned

DUI Drug Test Refusal 
DUI Defense Attorney Lawyer has previously written about refusal to take a drug urine test under § 322.2615(13) after blowing under .08 on a DUI Breath Test. License suspensions are overturned when there is no "competent substantial evidence" to support a DHSMV Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles Hearing Officer's ruling. In this recent case, the driver blew a .000, had a medical condition that made urination difficult, tried to give a sample, and the DUI cop classified the failure to give a sample as a refusal. He issued a notice of suspension and it was challenged by a DUI Defense Attorney. The court tossed the suspension, since there was insufficient evidence that the driver willfully refused to take a drug test. Our DUI Searchable Database is here.

Case Excerpts

"Corporal Zeichman transported the Petitioner to the police station and, while recording on camera, asked the Petitioner to submit to a breath test even though he did not believe that the Petitioner was under the influence of alcohol. The Petitioner agreed to take the breath test and was “very cooperative.” The Petitioner performed the breath test which subsequently resulted in scores of .000 and .000. Corporal Zeichman then asked the Petitioner on camera recording to perform a urine test, and the Petitioner agreed to do so. The Petitioner drank numerous glasses of water, repeatedly asked for additional time and water, and never told Corporal Zeichman that he refused to take the urine test. After forty-five minutes, Corporal Zeichman determined that the Petitioner's failure to urinate was a refusal. Corporal Zeichman then allegedly read the Petitioner Implied Consent Warnings. " (Citations to Record Omitted).

"In the context of an alleged refusal to submit to a urine test, it must be determined that the driver's “refusal [was] willful to the extent that if the [driver] is able to submit, he or she is expected to take the test.” 11 Fla. Prac., DUI Handbook § 10:2 (2010-2011 ed.) (emphasis added). In Wolok v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 204 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1992), the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida held that the failure to perform a urine test is not a refusal when the driver physically cannot provide a urine sample. See also Stack v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 322a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2006) (holding that the driver did not refuse a test because the driver was confused about whether the urine test was required).3 In Wolok, the defendant's failure to provide a urine sample was the result of the defendant having a ‘bashful kidney' and because “he was inhibited by the officer who stared at his genitals.” Wolok, 1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 204. The Wolok court thereby recognized that “[t]he only evidence before the hearing officer was that the petitioner could not urinate on demand.” Id." (Citations to Record Omitted).

"In this case, there is evidence that the Petitioner did not willfully refuse to provide a urine sample. Specifically, the record indicates that the Petitioner promptly performed a roadside sobriety test and a breath test when requested by Corporal Zeichman. " (Citations to Record Omitted).

"Thus, the Court finds that the Petitioner simply lacked the ability to perform the test as requested; consequently, his failure to provide a urine sample cannot constitute willful refusal. Therefore, based on the evidence in the record and the Court's interpretation of Wolok, this Court finds that the Hearing Officer's finding of willful refusal is not supported by competent substantial evidence." (Citations to Record Omitted).

DUI Drug Urine Test Refusal? Call Casey at 813-222-2220.

Thứ Bảy, 26 tháng 11, 2011

Pardon | Seal | Expunge

Presidential Pardons are at 22 and counting under President Barack Obama as of November 2011. A Tampa Bay, Florida resident benefited from a "presidential pardon this week [and]  called his earlier felony a "youthful indiscretion" that happened after he got mixed up in the wrong crowd."

Pardon vs. Seal | Expunge

According to the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) "[w]hile a presidential pardon will restore various rights lost as a result of the pardoned offense and should lessen to some extent the stigma arising from a conviction, it will not erase or expunge the record of your conviction.

Free Florida Sealing and Expunge Web App

We have place a free Florida Sealing and Expunge Web App on SealMyFile.com. Check and See If You Are Eligible To Have Your Record Sealed Or Expunged. The contact The Law Office of Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer W.F. "Casey" Ebsary, Jr. at 813-222-2220.

Presidential Pardon Download Application Here.

Federal Offense Only

"Under the Constitution, only federal criminal convictions, such as those adjudicated in the United States District Courts, may be pardoned by the President. " Furthermore, "if you are seeking clemency for a state criminal conviction, you should not complete and submit [a Presidential Pardon] petition. Instead, you should contact the Governor or other appropriate authorities of the state where you reside or where the conviction occurred (such as the state board of pardons and paroles) to determine whether any relief is available to you under state law. "

Five Year Waiting Period

"Under the Department's rules governing petitions for executive clemency, 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 et seq., an applicant must satisfy a minimum waiting period of five years before he becomes eligible to apply for a presidential pardon of his federal conviction. "

Application Tip:

When completing the application, "you should state the specific purpose for which you are seeking pardon and, if applicable, attach any relevant documentary evidence that indicates how a pardon will help you accomplish that purpose (such as citations to applicable provisions of state constitutions, statutes, or regulations, or copies of letters from appropriate officials of administrative agencies, professional associations, licensing authorities, etc.). In addition, you should bear in mind that a presidential pardon is ordinarily a sign of forgiveness and is granted in recognition of the applicant's acceptance of responsibility for the crime and established good conduct for a significant period of time after conviction or release from confinement. "

USDOJ Has Penalty for False Statements

"The failure to fully and accurately complete the application form may be construed as a falsification of the petition, which may provide a reason for denying your petition. In addition, the knowing and willful falsification of a document submitted to the government may subject you to criminal punishment, including up to five years’ imprisonment and a $250,000 fine. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 3571."

Source:  http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/presidential-pardon-brings-relief-stirs-regret-wesley-chapel-man-tells/1203163


http://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardon_instructions.htm

Pardon?  Seal? Expunge? Call 813-222-2220

Thứ Sáu, 25 tháng 11, 2011

Thứ Tư, 23 tháng 11, 2011

Shuster & Saben Recovers $8,717.50 from Bank of America.


A previous blog post described how Shuster & Saben, LLC sued Bank of America for violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, ( FCCPA) on behalf of a Brevard County foreclosure defense client. The firm filed a separate lawsuit against Bank of America rather than filing a counterclaim in the underlying foreclosure case. After Bank of America failed to show up for Court the firm obtained a default and a default final judgment for $2,000.00 of damages for our client. When Bank of America failed to show up for the fee hearing the firm obtained an award of attorney’s fees, costs, expert witness fees and interest of over $6,700.00. When Bank of America failed to pay the judgments within ten days, firm attorney Richard Shuster, wrote Bank of America’s in-house legal department and threatened to levy on the judgment and seize bank assets in Melbourne, Florida if the judgment was not paid by November 23, 2011. Earlier this week, as the firm prepared to levy on the judgment, a check arrived by Federal Express at the firm’s Melbourne office. Our client will now receive $2,000.00 in damages plus interest for Bank of America contacting the client after a notice of attorney representation was sent to the bank. All of the attorney’s fees and costs for the litigation have been paid by Bank of America. While Bank of America’s foreclosure action against our client continues, our client’s case against Bank of America was won in under six months.

About Shuster & Saben: Shuster & Saben accepts referrals from other law firms whose clients have been directly contacts by lenders and loan servicers after such companies were put on notice that the consumer is represented by counsel. We also co-counsel with firms that have not previously sued banks and loan servicers. Shuster & Saben has a zero tolerance policy for lenders, loan servicers, and bill collectors who harass firm clients with letters or calls. Consumers with questions about the FCCPA or who want calls from bill collectors to stop can contact the firm by E-mail at foreclosuredefenselaw@gmail.com.

3d DCA Watch -- Jive Turkey Edition.



It's the day before Thanksgiving -- why are you still in the office?

But today is a special 3d DCA Watch, when the written utterances wafting northward from the bunker include just a seasonal hint of sage, cranberry sauce, warm fresh baked apple pie, and lingering three-day old sock sweat (I'm not saying which judge worked out last in the mechanical room/gym/storage closet before taking off for the holidays).

So absorb it all in and let the holiday commencements commence:

Gorrin v. Poker Run:

What does "meaningfully distinguishable" mean?  Is that "distinguishable minus one"?

KJB Village v. Dorne:

The sad story of the demise of North Bay Village's Siam Bagel -- a classic South Florida real estate boondoggle.

Pederson v. Boggess:

Hmm, this is a per curiam reversal in which Judge Schwartz sat on the panel.

Note the language:
Upon consideration of the appellees’ confession of error, which we find to be eminently well taken, the default money judgment under review is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
I think I know who wrote that!

Fortune Int'l v. M Resort:

So now receivers are supposed to be neutral:
When a party itself is paying substantial funds into a receivership, as here, it seems reasonable that some of those funds might be authorized for payment of that party’s attorneys. But the linchpin of a receivership is the principle that a receiver, like the appointing court itself, is a neutral party in the underlying dispute. The receiver’s role is the preservation and protection of the assets in dispute, not as a paying agent for the litigation-related legal expenses of one of the parties.
With the exception of that firm which now has to disgorge all those fees -- have a great Thanksgiving weekend!

The Day The Toes Stopped Tapping.



Yes kids, the dreaded second of that foreboding minute of the momentous hour of that portentous day has arrived.

(I have no idea what any of that means.)

SIMPLY AMAZING!!

Here's a taste of Magistrate Judge Brown's order which, true to form in this case, was apparently filed erroneously under restriction (D.E. 1430) ("you do not have permission to view this document"), then refiled as D.E. 1431 in two parts (for which you have to pay(!) as if it's a pleading and not an order):
To be sure, this was a most unusual and unique case. The saga endured by plaintiffs might well make a script for a book. (Ed. -- or a whole mess of blog posts!) The ensuing claims addressed by defendant were as far from "run of the mill'' as anyone could imagine. The Court is not without sympathy for the ordeal plaintiffs went through. Indeed, the record is full of indicators of sympathy on several fronts -including that of at least one of the adjusters handling this case. This clearly contributed to the most unusual happenstance of - on more than one occasion - the defendant paying claims without supporting documentation, simply on the "say-so'' of Mr. Halmos, and in the end resulted in more than one substantial overpayment. The uncontroverted evidence is that an almost symbiotic relationship developed between Mr. Halmos and the primary INA adjuster, Pamela Harting- Forkey . . . until supporting materials for claim s were requested and claims began to be questioned. lt then turned quite adversarial - at least on the part of plaintiffs. Notwithstanding said sympathy, however, the Court reaches its decisions herein without being "influenced in any way by sympathy, or by prejudice, for or against anyone.'' Eleventh Circuit Standard Instruction regarding Consideration of The Evidence.
Let's just say the case came down to credibility determinations, and here's a small example of where the Judge's head was at on that issue:
Third, IYC intentionally misrepresented that the Merideth Law Firm invoices were "legal and Legal Support Services'' related to salvage and protection against loss of the Legacy due to Hurricane Wilma, even though the time was for Halmos, a non-lawyer partner in the District of Columbia-based Merideth Law Firm, and his employees. See FF 148-50. 'I'he Court finds Mr. Halmos' "partnership'' in Washington D.C. of no significance, as the alleged work done and billed) was done in Florida, not in D.C., and by Mr. Halmos' own version of the facts, was done under supervision of a Florida lawyer.   There is no evidence in this record of that lawyers' affiliation with the Merideth Law Firm. In making such representations, Halmos not only violated the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, see D.C. R. Prof Conduct 5.541) (prohibiting individuals from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in other jurisdictions, such as Florida); D.C. R.Prof Conduct 5.409(2) & (3) (the nonlawyer in partnership with the District of Columbia law organization must abide by (the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct), he violated Florida law, see Fla. Stat. j 454.23 ("Any person not licensed or otherwise authorized to practice 1aw in this state who practices 1aw in this state or holds himself or herself out to the public as qualified to practice law in this state, or who willfully pretends to be, or willfully takes or uses any name, title, addition, or description implying that he or she is qualifed, or recognized by law as qualified, to practice law in this state, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in sec 775.082, sec 775.083, or sec 775.084.5').
Huh?

Maybe this loopy version is more appropriate here:

Thứ Ba, 22 tháng 11, 2011

Your Honor, I Have Controlling Authority Directly On Point: Keith Urban!



Magistrate Judge Goodman, whose penchant for lyrical citations has been discussed here before, takes us on another musical adventure:
To borrow lyrics, albeit out of context, from a Keith Urban song, “And maybe it’s a little too early / To know if this is gonna work.”3
Ok Judge, I'm with you.

Let's see what footnote three says:
3 Urban, Keith. “You Look Good In My Shirt.” Lyrics. Golden Road. Capitol, 2002, available at http://www.lyrics007.com/Keith%20Urban%20Lyrics/You%20Look%20Good%20In%20My%20Shirt%20Lyrics.html. Born in New Zealand, Urban is a country singer/songwriter who was voted Top New Male Vocalist at the 2001 Country Music Association Awards. He was named CMA’s Entertainer of the Year in 2005. In 2006, Urban won his first Grammy Award and married Australian-born actress Nicole Kidman later that year. Keith Urban Biography - Facts, Birthday, Life Story, http://www.biography.com/people/keith-urban-193217 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). Based on preliminary research, it does not appear that Mr. Urban has released any songs expressly discussing the concept of Article III standing.
Oy -- you were doing great until you big-footed it right at the end!

(Leave that to us professionals....)



Thứ Hai, 21 tháng 11, 2011

Of Course Glenn Garvin is Now Covering the Occupy Miami Protests.



It makes sense -- there is literally no other Miami Herald reporter better suited to report objectively on the protests, is there?

I like this part of Glenn's report:
“And I heard last night that one of the women is pregnant, so maybe we’re going to have our first baby,” says Kelley Roark, a Miami attorney who supports Occupy Miami and has advised the movement in its sometimes-prickly negotiations with the county over its permit to use the plaza.
Good for you, Kelley!  (You can learn more about Ms. Roark's practice here).

To give Glenn a mild amount of credit, his report makes no reference to bra-burners, "free love," Nixon, or Maude, so I'm putting it in the plus column.

Thứ Sáu, 18 tháng 11, 2011

Fifth District Reverses for Failure to Honor Stipulation and Make Findings as to Rental Value

The Fifth District Court reversed today in Tuomey v. Tuomey, in so doing finding merit in two arguments raised by the former husband in his appeal of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage.  First, the Court neglected to include the parties’ stipulation as to contact between a relative and the minor children, and the Fifth DCA found this to be error, citing Johnson v. Johnson, 663 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).  Next, the trial court was found to be in error for offsetting the Former Husband’s payment of expenses related to the former marital home pending its sale against its fair rental value without making any finding as to the amount of that rental value.  However, the Former Husband’s claim of error to the effect that the lower court distributed unvested stock options as a marital asset was rejected, as the record reflected on careful review that only vested options were distributed.

Doctor Shopping - Florida Medical Records Thrown Out

Drug Charge and Doctor-Shopping Defense Attorney Lawyer  notes a new case where although the court allowed evidence from warrantless seizure of pharmacy records, it granted a Motion to Suppress Evidence from medical records and discussions with doctors that were also obtained without a warrant. We have previously covered this law here: 

Florida Statute: 893.13.7A8 is a Third Degree Felony.

Statute Excerpt: 893.13 Prohibited acts; penalties.

(7)(a) It is unlawful for any person:

8. To withhold information from a practitioner from whom the person seeks to obtain a controlled substance or a prescription for a controlled substance that the person making the request has received a controlled substance or a prescription for a controlled substance of like therapeutic use from another practitioner within the previous 30 days.

Here are the Doctor Shopping Case Facts:

The officer had reason to believe that Defendant was committing the crime of withholding information from a physician and, as such, trafficking would ensue because the prescriptions received would have been fraudulent because of the withholding information. The officer goes to various pharmacies, pulls patient’s profiles. From those patients’ profiles, he finds out who the prescribing doctors are. He then goes to the prescribing doctors, in this case, [Dr. X and Dr. Y], and speaks with the doctors without any subpoena or search warrant being issued. The conversations include whether or not Defendant had disclosed previous prescriptions to the
doctor. The officer also pulled and reviewed various patient documents.

Doctor Shopping Case Excerpts:

"Medical records and physician’s statements are protected by the statutory physician-patient privilege, and therefore, the State was required to get either a subpoena with court approval or prior notice to and authorization from Defendant. See §§ 456.057(6) & (7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008)."

"The fact that the police had already secured doctors’ names from prescriptions at pharmacies does not waive the requirements of law. There is a danger of medical professionals willing to surrender private medical records and engage in discussions regarding private and privileged communications concerning their treatment of individuals in submission to apparent police authority."

"The language in Section 456.057 is intentionally broad in protecting information from being disclosed by a health care practitioner and in assuring that the condition of a patient may not be discussed. The protection extends to all patient records. The State is not precluded from obtaining the information it seeks. Its agents must only follow the law and either seek a patient’s written authorization or the issuance of a subpoena from a court of competent jurisdiction and proper notice to the patient or a search warrant."

"The object of the physician-patient privilege is to encourage patients to be entirely forthcoming and candid in their statements to their treating physicians. These conversations and the records with regard thereto protect our most fundamental right, the pursuit of life itself."

Click Here for the Free complete Opinion Download.

Source: 4th DCA No. 4D10-777 November 16, 2011

If you or someone you care about have been charged with Doctor Shopping you can call a Florida Criminal Defense Attorney at 813-222-2220 and tell me your story.



Tampa Doctor Shopping Florida Attorney Lawyer

A Look Inside Ruden's Bankruptcy.



Am Law Daily has a great history and summary of how venerable Ruden McClosky wound up in bankruptcy court, relying in large part on Julie Kay's terrific reporting:
After more than two years of partner defections, layoffs, office closings, and mounting financial difficulties, Ruden McClosky filed for Chapter 11 protection Tuesday in its hometown of Fort Lauderdale.  The firm, which has eight offices in Florida, plans to sell a substantial portion of its assets to Greenspoon Marder, another Fort Lauderdale–based firm, according to sibling publication the Daily Business Review.
Founded in 1959, Ruden McClosky had vociferously denied that it would consider dissolving, even as a flood of lateral departures caused the firm to suffer financially. Ruden McClosky responded to the loss of lawyers by shaking up its leadership and pursuing potential mergers with Cleveland-based Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff over the summer and Greenspoon Marder last month.
Ruden McClosky, which once boasted more than 200 lawyers, was hit hard by the collapse of the Florida real estate market and saw its head count dwindle to its current total of 66 lawyers. In its bankruptcy filing, the firm lists both debts and assets of between $10 million and $50 million.
But the deal was contingent on former partners accepting only 30 percent of their equity payments, an arrangement that has apparently collapsed:
The deal with Greenspoon Marder was contingent on 58 former Ruden McClosky equity partners accepting payouts of 30 percent on $3.5 million in outstanding equity payments, according to DBR. Ruden McClosky had stopped making payments to former partners in January, and many of those same partners faced a Monday deadline to reach a deal on the remaining $3.5 million obligation so that the agreement with Greenspoon Marder could proceed. The sale to Greenspoon Marder was structured as a sale, rather than a merger, so that the successor firm wouldn't acquire any of Ruden McClosky's liabilities, according to a lawyer familiar with the Chapter 11 case.
But the South Florida Business Journal reported Wednesday that the plan to pay dozens of former Ruden McClosky partners had collapsed prior to the firm filing its Chapter 11 petition, and that they would have to file claims with the bankruptcy court in order to recoup what they are owed. Lawrence Gordich, a former Ruden McClosky partner who left the firm last year to open his own shop in Miami, is representing a group of ex-partners in the case. Gordich did not respond to a request for comment.
 You car crash gawkers can see the bankruptcy docket here and the Chapter 11 filing here.

Thứ Năm, 17 tháng 11, 2011

Third DCA Reverses Emergency Relocation Order

The Third District Court of Appeal reversed yesterday in Mata v. Mata, a case in which the lower tribunal had granted the appellee’s emergency motion to permit relocation of the parties’ minor child to North Carolina.  The lower court did not take evidence or testimony, but found based on argument and the pleadings that a temporary relocation would be permitted.  The District Court reversed on the basis that the lower court did not consider the factors in F.S. 61.13002(6)(b)(2) before granting the Mother’s motion for a temporary relocation.  The Court made no finding of a likelihood that the eventual relocation would be granted, and its failure to take testimony or evidence supporting the ruling was found unreasonable as well.

Support Order Reversed for Improper Deviation

The First District Court of Appeal reversed yesterday in D.O.R., ex rel Sherman v. Daly, finding that the lower court improperly deviated from the guideline support amount by using the “gross up” method for calculating support in a case where not the parenting plan, but rather the parties’ informal agreement, provided for substantially shared time-sharing between the parents.

Fourth District Reverses for Failure to Find Net Income

The Fourth District Court reversed the lower tribunal’s judgment granting a modification of child support in Capo v. Capo yesterday, finding that the lower court’s failure to make findings as to the net income of each party as a starting point for calculating child support was sufficient to require remand.

Retroactive Modification of Support Reversed

The Fourth District Court of Appeal issued an opinion yesterday in Escobar v. Escobar, in so doing reversing the lower court’s determination that a retroactive modification of child support back to the date of a 2004 Final Judgment was required.  The ruling below was based on conflicting statements in the Final Judgment as to whether the support was to be paid bi-weekly or semi-monthly.  The Fourth District found error in the lower tribunal’s essential overruling of a final, prior ruling that found no ambiguity in the Final Judgment’s determination of support, which was not appealed.  Error was also found in the Court’s review of issues not properly plead.

Dear Magistrate Judge Simonton: The Stones Are Not Just a "Music Band."



I absolutely adore Magistrate Judge Simonton, but with respect I have to take issue with this language:
On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff produced documents to Defendants by computer disc, in response to Defendants’ First Request for Production of Documents (DE # 68 at 2). The disc contained several documents, including emails and documents exchanged between Michael Rowles, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Plaintiff Live Nation Worldwide, Inc. (“Live Nation”), and Joyce Smyth, who is the personal representative of Mick Jagger, the lead singer of the music band The Rolling Stones (DE # 68 at 2).
Hold on -- "music band" the Rolling Stones?

That's it???

And the Beatles are merely "four lads from Liverpool"?  The Grand Canyon is "that hole in Arizona"?

Your Honor, would it have hurt to throw in "World's Greatest Rock and Roll Band"?

Just for us fans, of course....

Criminal Record Expunge Sealing Video | Attorney Lawyer in Florida

Seal Expunge Florida Record
Seal Expunge Video - Arrest in Florida? Your Criminal Record Does Not Have To Follow You Forever. 1 minute video on help available to Remove an arrest record through a criminal record expungement or record sealing in Florida. Call 813-222-2220.

Learn More here:
http://expungelaw.com/

My Office is Here:
http://www.centrallaw.com/W-F-Casey-Ebsary_Jr-Attorney.kml



Expunge Sealing Video | Attorney Lawyer in Florida

Law Updates for November 11, 2011

Hernandez, 36 FLW 648, Fla, A Driver's License Suspension can be predicated upon a refusal to submit to a breath test, not only if the refusal is incident to a lawful arrest.  Driver can not be precluded from challenging whether the refusal is from an unlawful arrest.

Page, 36 FLW 2395, 4th DCA, Trial court erred in finding that the officer's use of defendants's name and date of birth for a warrants check turned consensual encounter into an encounter requiring reasonable suspicion.

Blue, 36 FLW 2399, 4th DCA, Jessica Lunsford Act went into effect July 1, 2007.  If someone's case happened in 2001 and VOP in 2009, they do not automatically have to wear the monitor, but can still apply monitor under 948.30(2)(c) if the court makes the requisite findings.

Harris, 36 FLW 2400, 4th DCA, Possession of cocaine with intent to sell - Evidence was insufficient to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that crack cocaine found in defendant's possession was for personal use. The officer's conclusion that the fifty rocks found were for sale to others was not supported by any corroborating facts other than the amount, and the fact that the defendant did not possess any paraphernalia, and the rocks were all in one package.  This is a good summary of the case law in this area.





The Law Offices of Roger P. Foley, P.A.

The Situation Sues Abercrombie & Fitch!



And Judge Lenard has it.

Oy veh!

Here are the claims in a nutshell:
          While on the hit TV show the “Jersey Shore” and as in his everyday life, Sorrentino (along with other cast members) occasionally wore Abercrombie brand clothing.
              Starting August 2011, Defendant embarked on a grand, worldwide advertising campaign using Sorrentino’s name, image and likeness to create brand awareness for its products by falsely claiming that Defendant had offered money to Sorrentino if he would stop wearing Defendant’s goods. 
          Defendant concocted this false advertising campaign using the name and image of Sorrentino, to promote and advertise Defendant’s stores and its products. This advertising campaign claimed that Sorrentino was contrary to the “aspirational nature of the (Abercrombie) brand”.
As part of the campaign, on August 12, 2011 stories were written by the press stating that the advertising campaign was a “marketing ploy” designed “to further (Abercrombie’s) name into the marketplace with one of the hottest brands on tv” which was intentionally and strategically released at the peak of the back to school season.  A true and  correct copy of the press release is attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and hereafter called the “Press Release”
        As part of the marketing ploy, Defendant contacted representatives of MTV (the network that distributes the “Jersey Shore”) and allegedly offered to pay money to the Sorrentino if he would stop wearing Abercrombie brand clothing while on the show and at other times. 
           That offer was never made to Sorrentino, nor was it ever conveyed to Sorrentino by a representative of Defendant.
           Defendant claimed in the press release that by wearing Abercrombie clothing, Sorrentino would be “causing significant damage” to the image of the Abercrombie brand.  In essence, Defendant’s campaign was to make the ridiculous claim that Sorrentino was not worthy enough to wear Abercrombie clothing or that Sorrentino was so undesirable that wearing Abercrombie clothing would cause “damage” to Defendant.  The center piece of the advertising campaign was the huge success and popularity of Sorrentino.  The falsity of the advertising campaign is further demonstrated by Defendants actions to (at the same time that they are claiming that Sorrentino was damaging their image) attempt to associate themselves with Sorrentino by openly advertising specifically designed t-shirts using the Plaintiffs’ Marks.


Bài đăng phổ biến