Chủ Nhật, 17 tháng 2, 2008

4th DCA Mis-Cites GBV to Overrule Irvine and Most Administrative Law

OK, back on my soapbox.

The Fourth DCA committed a frequent but grave error in Wal-Mart v. Town of Davie when it cited the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in G.B.V. Int'l for the proposition that written findings are not required in quasi-judicial decisions involving zoning and land use.

Fact: there is langauge to that effect in G.B.V. ,and in fact a disagreement among the justices, but it is pure dicta. Fact: No party raised or briefed the issue in that case, or in the Florida National Properties opinion that was released the week before G.B.V. What happened is that Justice Pariente - quite rightly, and consistent with ALL prior cases except Snyder -- raised the absence of written findings as so inhibiting to effective judicial review as to deny due process. The other justices didn't agree - but agreed to refer the matter to the Justice Administration Commission, which in turn found no authority to adopt rules on the matter.

Fact: Prior to Snyder, every reported cases in Florida that can be found (and pretty much every federal case on administrative proceedings) held that written findings were a due process requirement because effective judicial review is impossible without them. See the cases cited by Justice Pariente in G.B.V., but more importantly, see Snyder and Irvine v. Duval County .

Fact: The controlling decision under Florida law for all quasi-judicial decision except rezoning remains Irvine, where the Supreme Court reversed the 1st DCA and approved the dissent below and where the 1st DCA on remand adopted the dissent as its opinion. That dissent established not only the "burden shifting test" for special exceptions (and other quasi-judicial decisions) but clearly and unequivocally reiterated longstanding Florida law that required written findings in all quasi-judicial zoning decisions.

Fact: Snyder declined to apply the Irvine written findings rule to rezonings, but never held that the findings requirement did not apply to any other decision. Nor could it, because that broad issue was not raised below -- the argument briefed and at issue in Snyder was only whether the Irvine rule applied to rezonings, NOT whether it was the right statement of the law.

Law: Under standards of appellate review, dicta and unbriefed issues are NOT precedent and NOT binding on later courts. See. e.g., Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404, 414 ( Fla. 1991). As the Florida Supreme Court stated the rule:
We take this opportunity to expressly state that this Court does not
intentionally overrule itself sub silentio. Where a court encounters an express
holding from this Court on a specific issue and a subsequent contrary dicta
statement on the same specific issue, the court is to apply our express holding
in the former decision until such time as this Court recedes from the express
holding. Where this Court's decisions create this type of disharmony within the case law, the district courts may utilize their authority to certify a question of great
public importance to grant this Court jurisdiction to settle the law.
Puryear v. State, 810 So.2d 901, 905-906 (Fla. 2002).

Snyder did NOT expressly overrule its earlier decision in Irvine, or the First District's express ruling. It simply declined to extend it. The dicta in Florida National Properties and G.B.V. did not and could not overrule Irvine or extend Snyder because the issue of written findings was not before the court.

Therfore, the Fourth District's opinion in this case is legally wrong, as are the numerous circuit court decisions that "follow" Snyder and refuse to follow Irvine.

Differential Treatment of "Assembly" for Commercial and Religious Uses Violates RLUIPA as a Matter of Law

In Chabad of Nova v. City of Cooper City, the Southern District found on a motion for judgment on the pleadings that the city was liable under RLUIPA. Various commercial districts allowed uses that involve "assembly" of people -- like restaurants, theaters, clubs, etc. Religious assemblies were prohibitted, however.

While the city claimed that "business assemblies" were equally prohibitted, the court saw this as pretextual at best and found liability based on the city's admissions that theaters, restaurants and similar uses were permitted.

Fla S Ct rejects Review in Pennisular Properties: 70.51 Stays Time for Filing Cert

In City of Bradenton v. Pennisular Properties, the Fla. Supreme Court rejected the City's appeal. This leaves the 2d DCA's opinion in force, which means that filing a request for mediation under 70.51, Fla. Stat. stays the time for filing for certiorari review.

The 70.51 process provides for mediation and then what I call a "magistration," where a special magistrate will determine whether a government decision is unreasonable or unfairly burdens property. The magistrate's recommendation (or a settlement) can be the basis of a local government action to implement the settlement, including new variances, etc.

The petition is a simple 2 page affair, cheap and easy to do.

Many local government attorneys dislike this process - they don't like the idea of tainting a nice clean denial with messy processes with standards that don't unduly favor the government.

But by allowing more time to not only file the cert petition, but also to line up other defenses or causes of action (your Bert Harris claim, for example), filing a 70.51 provides a means for bringing more firepower to bear on the mediation process and increase the likelihood of settlement without filing the litigation. By holding that the stay provision applies to certiorari, the Second assured the usefulness of this tool, which should be in every developer attorney's toolbox.

Mobile Home Statute Doesn't Apply if Eviction Before Rezoning

In Celebration Pointe Townhomes v. Rancho Margate Mobile Home Park, the Fourth District held that the owner of a mobile home park is not subject to the relocation and alternate site availability requirements of Chapter 723 do not apply where the owner of the park evicts residents for a statutorily acceptable reason and process before applying for rezoning.

Illegal Exactions Protected by Bond Validation

In Frederick et al v. Northern Palm Beach County Improvement District et al, the District Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of claims raised by various homeowners who claimed that they were subjected to unconstitutional exactions.

The homeowner's predecessors in interest (the developer) cut a deal with the county to set up an improvement district to fund not only the roads internal to the project, but also to build a major section of arterial road. While the project was still under the developer's control, an assessment was levied (for 20 years) against property in the development and the bonds were validated.

None of the other developments who benefit from the improved major road were assessed. Later, homeowners subject to the assessment -- understandably annoyed when they realized they were paying for infrastructure for the entire area, and effectively subsidizing the other developments-- sued to establish that the assessments were illegal because they were not proportionate to the impacts of the paying development.

The circuit court dismissed, holding that the statute of limitations had run the validation of the bonds precluded later challenges to the assessments. The District Court affirmed, holding that the homeowners were bound by their predecessor's knowledge of the date of the validation/action.
In the case now before us, we must balance the interests of the Homeowners in
receiving notice of the exclusive nature of the Unit 18 assessments against the
public policy concerns highlighted in H&B Builders. Weighing these competing
interests, we find that, on these facts, the Homeowners interests are outweighed
by the need of the District for certainty in creating water management plans and
funding those plans. As a result, the approval and creation of the assessments
and impact fees here by the District provided sufficient notice to then existing
and future homeowners of their obligations. This is true even if the assessments
and impact fees were improperly levied. See Ves Carpenter, 422 So. 2d 342;
Spring Lake Improvement District, 814 So. 2d 1077.

So, clearly, sue before you buy - or at least be sure that your developer did.

Court permits creation of "aspirational policies" in comp plans

In Indian Trails Improvement District v. Department of Community Affairs , the 5th DCA approved the County's effective planning-based takeover of an independent utility's franchise area by creating a new category of "aspirational policies" which the local government can adopt with no supporting data and analysis.

What is an aspirational policy? Why would it be needed in a comp plan? What happens when the local government starts giving it regulatory meaning as justification for other actions?

On the other hand, the Court did hold that indirect impacts on a business or other interest can be sufficient to establish that a person is "aggreived or adversely affected" for standing.

Failure to Appear or Raise Issues at QJ Hearing Does not Preclude Standing under 163.3215

In Dunlop v. Orange County, the 5th DCA held that a aggreived neighbor is not precluded by waiver from demonstrating standing and raising issues in a de novo proceeding under 163.3215 for failure to do so in the quasi-judicial proceeding before the local agency.

Yeah, it's obvious: if you have a de novo hearing, all of the issues are de novo. Didn't stop Orange County from claiming waiver and preclusion to the apparently clueless circuit court.

Just another example that the circuit courts (improperly, in way too many cases) trust the positions of local government attorneys over their private counterparts, whether they are representing developers or neighbors. The result: effectively unreviewable discretion. De novo proceedings under 163.3215 are one of the exceptions -- too bad the courts refuse to give effect to the 2002 amendments and allow landowners to challenge improper interpretations of the plan to deny development orders.

Thứ Năm, 7 tháng 2, 2008

Law Enforcement Has a Forensics Team - So Can You

In a computer forensics lab, the police have specialized equipment which prevents any alteration of original digital media such as hard drives, disks, and flash drives disks. In addition, they have hardware and software that will retrieve evidence from cell phones, such as text messages and pictures. For computers, specialized software is used to examine the computers and extract the evidence. Methods adopted from the International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists, a worldwide organization for computer forensics examiners, are sometimes used. At CentralLaw.com we use a forensics expert to help sort through data used in prosecution of federal indictments and state charges, fraud, hacking, theft of trade secrets, and other forms of cybercrimes.

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