11th Circuit Tackles Inchoate Iqbal Pleading Standard!

Careful readers know I have a obsession with fondness for certain people and issues that the blog tends to return to again and again -- or maybe I'm just out of material?

Anyways, I'm happy to see the 11th Circuit clarify the Iqbal pleading standard in an opinion reversing Judge Graham, who granted a 12(b)(6) motion on those grounds.

Let's see if you can tell what particular (and tragic) factual allegations really tipped the scales in favor of allowing the case to proceed past the initial stages of a motion to dismiss, as opposed to being gone for all eternity:

Appellants’ complaint alleges the following: a Carnival employee encouraged Appellants to visit Coki Beach in St. Thomas; Carnival was familiar with Coki Beach because it sold excursions there; Carnival generally knew of gang violence and public shootings in St. Thomas; Carnival knew of Coki Beach’s reputation for drug sales, theft, and gang violence; Carnival knew or should have known of the gang member’s shooting and funeral taking place near Coki Beach; Carnival failed to warn Appellants of any of these dangers; Carnival knew or should have known of these dangers because Carnival monitors crime in its ports of call; Carnival’s negligence in encouraging its passengers to visit Coki Beach and in failing to warn disembarking passengers of general and specific incidents of crime in St. Thomas and Coki Beach caused Liz Marie’s death; and Appellants have suffered various damages, including the loss of Liz Marie’s life. This negligent failure-to-warn claim is more than a mere recitation of the elements of the cause of action. The facts alleged in the complaint are plausible and raise a reasonable expectation that discovery could supply additional proof of Carnival’s liability. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. We consequently conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Appellants’ negligence claim under Iqbal.

See, it's like art or pornography (or pornographic art) -- you just know it when you see it!

Congrats to Phil Parrish on a big win -- now you get to litigate your case and try to prove up some of these allegations (the ruling on duty to warn should help).

Have a great weekend!

Phil Parrish Strikes Back!

 Appellee's Motion for Rehearing en Banc


The Brickell Honda motion for rehearing en banc has arrived!

The Brickell Honda motion for rehearing en banc has arrived!

The Brickell Honda motion for rehearing en banc has arrived!

(I get excited by things like this.)

Notably, if Phil's brief is to be believed, the bizarre issue of class counsel's inability to fund the litigation was raised sua sponte by the Court, and was not identified as error by the Appellant or even mentioned in the briefs.

Isn't there some sort of appellate rule about that kind of thing?

3d DCA Watch -- New Trial Granted! (Hmm, Did I Forget Something?)

 Well la dee dah!

I guess you Fancy Pants appellate judges can issue content-free PCAs all day and night, but God forbid my new trial order lacks the specificity Your Highness demands:

Elena Casines appeals from the trial court’s May 12, 2010, “Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for New Trial.” Because the order does not contain specific grounds, we relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for sixty days for entry of an order specifying the grounds upon which the trial court relied to grant a new trial.

Question -- could you be more specific?

Seriously, what specificity is the Court looking for, and can some guidance be provided for future cases in which this situation may arise?

You know, precedent and all that.

Miami Automotive Retail v. Baldwin:

Specific oral misrepresentations usually make tough class certification cases.

Ok, and I agree.

But Phil Parrish needs to establish a record that he can fund the litigation?

Now that's just plain odd.