In a messy legal malpractice case against Broad and Cassel and some of its attorneys, Judge Altonaga has denied a motion to disqualify Feldman Gale, largely relying on client consents obtained after the motion was filed:
And in this case, after the present Motion was filed, both Delaware Valley and Esprit executed written waivers of conflict. (See Notice Waivers ¶ 4; Waivers 4–8). Now, Broad speculates that Delaware Valley and Esprit’s consent is not “informed” because “the very fact that Feldman Gale argues that . . . there is no such conflict makes it questionable that Feldman Gale provided the [information] necessary for a conflict waiver to be valid and effective.” (Reply 8). Admittedly, Broad lodged its objections to the waivers prior to their filing, not knowing the waivers’ contents. But subsequent to Shaw’s filing of the waivers, Broad has not requested the opportunity to submit any further argument addressing why the waivers are insufficient.But the Judge gives a big hint:
Moreover, Broad has not requested an evidentiary hearing or the opportunity to engage in discovery concerning the former clients’ understanding of the nature of the conflict and how it may present itself during the course of this litigation. Appropriately viewing Broad’s Motion with “skepticism,” and without more explanation from Broad beyond the conjecture presented prior to the waivers being revealed, there is no reason to discount the effectiveness of the waivers. Accordingly, the waivers are preliminarily found to be sufficient under Rule 4-1.9(a) to permit Feldman Gale’s representation of Shaw.Hey, anybody want to schedule some depositions?
Không có nhận xét nào:
Đăng nhận xét